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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







ROTIMI A. OWOH; OBAFEMI R. OWOH; 
ROTIMI R. OWOH, II, 
  




JASON S. SENA; CUTOLO MANDELL, LLC 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. Civil Action No. No. 3-16-cv-04581) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 24, 2019  
 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants in a 
case involving their attempt to collect a debt and their compliance with the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Bankruptcy Code.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.   
I 
Plaintiff Rotimi Owoh is a condominium owner and the debtor in this case.  The 
other plaintiffs are Owoh’s children.1  Defendant Cutolo Mandell LLC is a law firm in 
New Jersey, and defendant Jason Sena is an attorney at that law firm who has served as 
Owoh’s point of contact regarding this debt.  In 2009, Owoh’s condominium association 
embarked on an improvement project that required substantial contributions from owners 
and levied a “Renovation Project Special Assessment” to fund it.  The owners were given 
the option to pay the full sum immediately or to make monthly payments to the 
association that would mirror a loan the association had obtained with Capital One Bank.2  
Owoh chose to make monthly payments and did so until 2014, when he filed for 
bankruptcy.  After the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, Owoh did not resume his 
monthly payments, but his balance continued to accrue.   
                                              
1 These plaintiffs, Obafemi Owoh and Rotimi Owoh II, alleged injury based on the 
same claims as their father in the complaint.  They were dismissed on September 22, 
2016, for lack of standing.  On appeal, plaintiffs dispute this dismissal and argue for 
standing.  References to “Owoh” in the remainder of the decision refer to the elder 
Rotimi Owoh. 
2 The only parties to the loan were the association and Capital One. 
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Defendants contacted Owoh in 2015 regarding his debt.  After he requested an 
itemized accounting of the debt, they sent him a statement on October 16, 2015, with an 
outstanding balance of $4,619.90.3  A claim of lien was filed on May 11, 2016, with an 
outstanding balance of $10,137.38.4  A Certificate of Amount of Unpaid Assessments, 
prepared by the condominium association and dated November 1, 2016, included 
$10,814.91 in assessments but also mentioned the $8,364.48 that had been discharged in 
the 2014 bankruptcy, for a total of $19,179.39.   
Plaintiffs sued under the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, claiming that (1) the 
2014 bankruptcy had discharged all debt under the monthly payment scheme and (2) 
defendants’ efforts to collect that debt were coercive and misleading and violated certain 
guarantees of specificity.  Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the 
District Court granted the motion in full on March 8, 2018.  The District Court 
determined that (1) Owoh’s repeated requests for verification did not themselves create 
an FDCPA violation, (2) plaintiffs’ coercion arguments were a reframing of the 
arguments that the 2014 bankruptcy had discharged all future monthly payments, (3) the 
varying numbers from defendants were not themselves indicia of falsity, and (4) the 
$19,179.39 amount on the certificate was irrelevant because the certificate was prepared 
by the condominium association, a non-party.  On June 12, 2018, the District Court 
denied several of plaintiffs’ post–summary judgment motions, including motions for 
                                              
3 The itemized list of fees and assessments owed included fees not at issue here. 
4 To the extent that this claim of lien was itemized, it included fees not at issue here. 
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reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment and to amend the complaint.  Plaintiffs 
appealed. 
II5 
 On appeal, plaintiffs raise several errors that they believe the District Court 
committed.6  None of them have merit.7     
 Owoh first argues that the District Court erred in determining that the assessment 
falls into the category contemplated by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) and is thus not discharged.  
This provision states that “a fee or assessment . . . with respect to the debtor’s interest in a 
unit that has condominium ownership” is not discharged if the debtor retains an 
ownership interest and the assessment comes due after bankruptcy.  He argues that the 
$123 monthly payment is not a fee or an assessment and correctly notes that the initial 
paperwork regarding the condominium improvements specifically refer to the monthly 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(d).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise de novo 
review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.”  Simpson v. Att’y Gen. 
U.S.A., 913 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2019).    
6 Plaintiffs’ brief provides fifteen issues to be reviewed, but we have distilled these 
issues into three categories of arguments, in addition to standing.  
7 As a preliminary matter, we must first address arguments regarding standing given 
that they are jurisdictional.  Plaintiffs claim that both Rotimi Owoh II and Obafemi Owoh 
have standing because they have been harmed by the debt collection proceedings.  
However, we agree with the District Court that the future injuries are speculative and thus 
do not confer standing.  Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Plaintiffs’ alternate argument about their inability to access the pool, garden, and 
other facilities and events must similarly fail.  Even if these injuries are constitutional 
injuries in fact, they are well outside the “‘zone of interests’ intended to be protected” by 
the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code and thus run afoul of prudential standing 
requirements.  Davis ex rel. Davis v. Phila. Housing Auth., 121 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 




payment plan as an “Association Loan.”8  Despite this, that paperwork also clearly stated 
that “the loan is taken out by the Association” and would not appear on credit reports, 
and it also referred to the payments as “the assessment” in virtually every other place in 
the paperwork.  Despite Owoh’s arguments to the contrary, the most natural 
characterization of the monthly payment is as a fee or assessment, particularly since the 
loan in question was obtained by the association without any input or assent from him.  
As a result, we conclude that § 523(a)(16) directly applies to the post-discharge payments 
at issue here.9   
Owoh also relies heavily on a November 1, 2016, Certificate of Amount of Unpaid 
Assessments in arguing that defendants have misrepresented the amount of debt due 
under the FDCPA.  But while the $19,179.39 amount listed in that certificate is 
substantially higher than the debt Owoh may be liable for, the certificate explicitly 
describes $8364.48 as having been partially discharged in the 2014 bankruptcy.  When 
that portion is excluded, the remaining $10,814.91 is numerically consistent with the 
other amounts discussed by Owoh.  The District Court’s conclusion that the $19,179.39 
amount was immaterial to the FDCPA claim was therefore correct.  To the extent that 
Owoh attempts to characterize the six remaining debt balances as creating an issue of 
material fact as to the FDCPA claim, there is no genuine dispute, since those balances 
                                              
8 App. 51. 
9 To the extent that plaintiffs argue that the question of the monthly payment’s 
characterization requires either further discovery or is a matter for the jury, we disagree; 
even when drawing justifiable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the payments cannot be 
reasonably characterized as loans.  Owoh’s reliance on a generalized fairness argument 
that notes that his bankruptcy would have discharged any loan he obtained himself also 
fails as it cannot override the statutory language of § 523(a)(16).  
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were prepared at six different points in time and they are consistent with both the accrual 
of interest and the monthly addition of unpaid balances.10  Indeed, finding otherwise 
would allow virtually all debtors to proceed to trial if they could obtain two documents 
with different loan balances. 
Owoh also argues that the inclusion of the $19,179.39 figure itself was sufficiently 
confusing to violate the FDCPA.11  We need not reach that question, however, as the 
District Court’s determination that the certificate was created by the association, a non-
party, was not in error.  While the non-moving parties are entitled to “justifiable 
inferences” in their favor,12 Owoh argues that his receipt of the certificate from 
defendants should suffice to create an issue of material fact as to its authorship.  This is 
beyond a justifiable inference, and it cannot, without additional evidence, overcome the 
fact that the property manager for the association signed the certificate.13  The District 
Court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment. 
                                              
10 This case is therefore distinguishable from Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A., 783 
F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015), abrogated in part on other grounds, Obduskey v. McCarthy & 
Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019), and McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, 
LLP, 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2014), where the plaintiffs claimed that certain specific debts 
were included prematurely in the amount due. 
11 Such claims are subject to the “least sophisticated debtor” standard, in that an 
FDCPA violation exists if “the objective least sophisticated debtor would be” “confused 
or misled” by a representation made by a debt collector.  Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 
882 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 
418–19 (3d Cir. 2015)).  Owoh argues that the certificate meets this standard because a 
bankruptcy judge in a related case expressed concern that the language in the certificate 
might be misleading.   
12 Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Marino v. Indus. 
Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
13 This is particularly true in light of the fact that the certificate must be produced 




For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
